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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/ Respondent Earline Chance obtained judgment foreclosing on a Deed of Trust 
against Defendant Carole Blazier-Henry. Ms. Chance did not attend the sale of the subject 
property and the Sheriff did not bid in the amount of her judgment, but accepted a bid from 
Intervenor Roy Jacobson in the amount of$I,OOO. Ms. Chance successfully had the Sheriff Sale 
set aside. 
B. Proceedings Below 
Ms. Chance moved the District Court for an Order setting aside the sale or extending the 
redemption period. The District Court ruled she was entitled to either, entered an Order setting 
the sale aside, and confirmed that ruling after motion to reconsider. 
C. Facts 
Plaintiff/Cross Appellant Earline Chance (hereinafter "Chance") filed suit to collect a 
note owed to her, and secured by a Deed of Trust, by Defendant Carole Blazier-Henry 
(hereinafter "Henry,,).l (R.9-43) Henry failed to answer the complaint and default was taken 
against her. (R.55) Thereafter, default judgment was entered against Henry in the amount of 
$72,667.25. (R.57) 
Chance caused to issue a writ of execution on April 20, 2009, in the amount of 
$87,211.07. (R.62) On April 27, 2009, the Bonner County Sherifflevied on the Henry real 
] Who is not a party to this appeal. 
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property. (R.66) Then, on May 1,2009, the Bonner County Sheriff issued a notice of sale setting 
the date for Sheriff Sale for June 2, 2009. (R.64) 
Chance's counsel believed that the Bonner County Sheriff would automatically bid in the 
amount set forth in the writ of execution (R.7S, ~S), and that she did not need to attend the sale in 
person as she had on several other occasions been involved in Sheriff Sales in other counties that 
did not require her attendance. (Aug R.23~) Chance's counsel did not attend the Sheriff Sale. 
Intervenor/Appellate Roy Jacobson (hereinafter "Jacobson") attended the Sheriff Sale. When 
neither Chance nor her counsel appeared at the Sheriff's Sale, the sale was postponed fifteen (1S) 
minutes. After this brief delay, the Sheriff proceeded with the sale and Jacobson bid One Dollar 
and No/IOO's Dollars ($1.00). The Sheriff informed Jacobson that his bid was inadequate. 
Jacobson then bid One Thousand Dollars and NoIlOO's Dollars ($1,000.00) and was the 
successful bidder on the property. (Aug R.S-6) The fair market value of the land as ofthe date of 
the sale was Ninety-Nine Thousand and Noll OO's Dollars ($99,000.00). (Aug R.34) 
Upon learning that a bid in the amount of the judgment was not submitted on behalf of 
the creditor, counsel for Chance engaged in negotiations with Bonner County to set aside the sale 
(Aug R. 23 ~I), based on the failure of the Bonner County Sheriff to submit the full amount of 
Chance's credit bid in the amount of the writ of execution. (Aug R.23 ~II) 
Bonner County indicated that it was in general agreement with Chance to set aside the 
Sheriff Sale on July 22, 2009, (Aug R.23 ~III) but the stipulation to set aside the Sheriff Sale 
was not signed by the County Attorney until November 11, 2009, (Aug R.23 ~III) 
notwithstanding Chance's counsel's efforts to obtain a signature sooner. (Aug R.23 ~IX) 
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At the same time, counsel for Chance was considering the option of exercising the 
judgment debtors' right of redemption, but declined based on the fact that Bonner County had 
stipulated to set aside the Sheriff s Sale. (Aug R. 23 ~I) 
Based on the stipulation with Bonner County, the District Court entered an Order setting 
aside the Sheriffs Sale on November 20,2009. Both the Stipulation (R.79) and Order (R.81) 
were mailed to Jacobson at the address he provided to the Sheriff. (R.72) On December 24, 
2009, Chance's counsel returned Jacobson's bid of One Thousand and No/lOO's Dollars 
($1,000.00) to him. (Aug R.20) Jacobson did not cash the check. 
Jacobson filed an ex parte motion to quash the order setting aside the Sheriffs Sale on 
December 30, 2009. (R.85) On January 5, 2010, the District Court granted the motion and 
quashed the Order setting aside the Sheriff Sale (R.97), which was served to the parties by mail 
the next day. (R.98) 
On January 19,2010, the Judgment debtor, Hemy, assigned all right title and interest she 
had in her right of redemption to Chance's counsel on the condition that Chance would cause the 
property to be again sold at Sheriff Sale and the proceeds applied towards the judgment. (R.l 02) 
That same day, Chance redeemed the subject property. (R.I0l) 
On March 29, 2010, Chance filed a lis pendens and served the same on counsel for 
Jacobson. (R.1 05-1 07) Chance attempted to obtain a hearing on the forthcoming motion to set 
aside the Sheriff Sale or extend the equitable period of redemption, but the earliest date Chance 
could obtain was March 14,2010, (Tr. Vo1.1 2, p 11, In. 1-5) and counsel for Jacobson agreed to 
the date of May 5, 2010, for hearing on the motions. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, In 17-20) 
2 The transcripts do not have volume numbers so the volume number assigned will correspond to which of the three 
hearings it is. 
3 
On April 16, 2010, Jacobson filed a motion to issue the Sheriffs Deed. (R.108) On April 
21,2010, Chance filed a motion to set aside the Sheriff Sale or, alternatively, to extend the 
redemption period. (Aug R.54) 
After hearing on May 5, 2010, the District Court ruled, "So in balancing the equities, it 
appears appropriate under these circumstances to set aside the sheriffs sale or allow 
redemption." (Tr. vol.1, p. 26, Ln.5-7) The District Court further found that very slight 
additional circumstances existed which justified setting aside the Sheriff Sale, but did not 
identify specifically the facts which supported the finding. (Tr. vol.1, p. 26, Ln.2-4) Thereafter, 
the District Court submitted an Order that set aside the Sheriff Sale. (R.121) 
Jacobson filed a motion to reconsider on May 27,2010, (R.129) and the matter was heard 
on October 6, 2010. The District Court held that, "On reconsideration, there does not appear to 
be very slight circumstances accompanying the gross inadequacy of price in this instance ... ". 
(R.170) However, the District Court also found that significant differences existed in the 
methods utilized by Bonner and Kootenai Counties in implementing a credit bid at Sheriff Sale. 
(R.169-170) 
The District Court then held that where the inadequacy of consideration paid at Sheriff 
Sale shocks the conscious of the Court, that alone is enough to set aside the Sheriff Sale. (R.170-
171 ) 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Is Jacobson's Appeal mooted by the fact that he did not appeal the District 
Court's alternative grounds from granting Chance relief from the Sheriff 
Sale - that the redemption period should be extended? 
II. Did the District Court commit error when it determined that the fact that 
Kootenai and Bonner Counties utilized different methods in implementing a 
credit bid at Sheriff Sale did not qualify as very slight additional 
circumstances which, when coupled with grossly inadequate consideration, 
would justify setting aside the Sheriff Sale? 
III. Is Chance entitled to attorneys fees on Appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court balanced the equities and determined that Chance was entitled to 
an extension of the redemption period. Jacobson cannot prevail under any 
circumstances because this finding has not been challenged on appeal. 
It is not necessary for this Court to consider whether or not the District Court did, and if it 
did, should have, adopted new law by holding that the Sheriff Sale could be set aside because the 
consideration paid was so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscious of the Court. The 
District Court also ruled that the balancing of the equities justified an extension of the 
redemption period. Since Jacobson has not listed this issue as an issue on appeal, Jacobson 
cannot prevail under any circumstances. 
Idaho Code § 11-402 provides for a six month or one year redemption period for parcels 
of real property sold at Sheriff Sale. This statutory right of redemption does not limit the ability 
of a District Court to extend the redemption period based upon other circumstances appealing to 
the discretion of the Court. Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Ruiz, 105 Idaho 140, 144 
666 P.2d 1151, 1155 (1983) citing Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 472, 482, 262 P.I 052 
(1928). "The granting of an equitable right of redemption is, in effect, a balancing of the equities 
that exists on either side of the dispute." Id. It requires that the party moving to extend the 
redemption period demonstrate to the District Court "'other circumstances appealing to the 
discretion of the chancellor.'" Id. 
Chance moved the District Court to issue an Order which would invalidate the sale to 
Jacobson. Chance advanced two separate theories to accomplish this: 1) an Order extending the 
redemption period, and 2) an Order setting aside the Sheriff Sale. The District Court specifically 
found that Chance was entitled to the relief she sought by either an extension of the right of 
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redemption or an Order setting aside the Sheriff Sale. The ruling regarding the extension of the 
redemption period was not appealed. 
"When a decision is 'based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may 
be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon 
one of the other grounds.'" Andersen v. Profl Escrow Services, Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 
P.3d 75,78 (2005) citing MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 671, 889 P.2d 103, 105 
(Ct.App.1995). Even if the District Court did, and should not have, adopted a new standard for 
setting aside a Sheriff Sale, the result in the District Court is the same because the District 
Court's ruling that the redemption period should be extended was not appealed. 
As more fully set forth below, the District Court carefully considered all the equities of 
the situation and determined that sufficient other circumstances existed for him to rule that the 
period of redemption should be extended.3 This finding has not been challenged on appeal and 
this Court should affirm the result of the District Court. 
II. The District Court did not adopt a new standard for setting aside a Sheriff Sale, and 
Jacobson did not appeal the District Court's conclusion that the sale price was so 
inadequate as to shock to the conscience of the Court. The District Court carefully 
considered all the equities and made a ruling that did substantial equity to all 
parties and should be affirmed. 
Jacobson paid 1.01 % of the fair market value of the subject property. This shocked the 
conscious of the District Court and considering all the equities, the District Court concluded that 
even if "slight additional circumstances" did not exist, the Sheriff Sale should be set aside. This 
is not new Idaho law; apparently this is just the first time such a ruling has been appealed. 
3 It is not conceded that the period had even expired. The order quashing the Order setting aside the Sheriff Sale 
was not nunc pro tunc so the effect of that Order on the redemption period is an unknown. 
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In Gibbs v. Claar, 58 Idaho 510, 520, 75 P.2d 721 (1938), members ofa board of 
directors of a defunct corporation as trustees appointed by the Court entered into a private sale of 
company assets for $4,000. Id at 513, 722. The Supreme Court viewed the sale as a judicial 
sale. Id at 519,724. The Trustees' action was subject to approval of the Court. In the process of 
obtaining that approval, the Trustees received higher bids. Id at 516, 723. The District Court 
refused to confirm the $4,000 sale and awarded the property to the highest bidder. Id. The party 
whom had the property under contract for $4,000 argued to the Supreme Court that the District 
Court cannot set aside a valid judicial sale unless the consideration paid was grossly inadequate. 
In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court stated, 
We quote from the opinion ofMr. Justice Brewer, in Ballentyne v. 
Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 27 S.Ct. 527, 528, 51 L.Ed. 803, which 
points the way to a correct decision of this case: 
"In England the old rule was that in chancery sales, 
until confirmation of the master's report, the bidding 
would be opened upon a mere offer to advance the 
price 10 per cent; but this rule has been rejected, 
and now both in England and this country a sale 
will not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price 
unless that inadequacy be so gross as to shock the 
conSCIence, or unless there be additional 
circumstances against its fairness. 
Gibbs v. Claar, 58 Idaho 510, 
520, 75 P.2d 721, 725 (1938) 
This District Court here did not adopt new law. It applied exiting law that a Court can set aside a 
Sheriff Sale if the price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience. This standard is older than 
the United States, and the District Court correctly applied it. 
Jacobson argues that a "shocks the conscience" standard is unworkably vague. The 
Ballentyne Court acknowledged this in citing the standard. "It is difficult to formulate any rule 
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more definite than this, and each case must stand upon its own peculiar facts." Ballentyne v. 
Smith, 205 U.S. 285 (1907). 
Jacobson also argues that the "shocks the conscience" standard also creates too much 
uncertainty for purchasers at Sheriff Sale and as a matter of public policy the standard should be 
ejected. The United States Supreme Court expressly acknowledged this argument in Ballentyne, 
but rejected the same. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 291, 27 S. Ct. 527, 529, 51 L. Ed. 803 
(1907). The situation where the consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the 
conscience of the Court is not likely to come up very often, but when it does, buyers who take 
advantage of the situation should not be surprised when a Court of Equity sets aside the sale. 
"Although he had an expectation of reaping the good fortune of Wells Fargo's bidding agent's 
misinformation through no fault of his own, Chukrallah necessarily was subject to the 
application of equitable principles. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ahmed L, 1332271, 2-4 
(N.J.Super.App.Div. 2010) (unpublished). 
The consideration paid in this case was 1.01% of the value of the property. Considering 
all the facts, this shocked the conscious of the District Court and it created a remedy to achieve 
the fairest result for all involved after balancing the equities before the District Court. Jacobson 
has not challenged this ruling on appeal and only challenged the adoption of a new standard. 
This is not a new standard and the District Court acted well within its discretion in applying it. 
A motion to set aside a judicial sale is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. v. Clapier, 121 Idaho 200, 202, 824 P.2d 131, 133 (Ct. 
App. 1991) citing Wiesel v. Ashcraft, 26 Ariz App. 490, 549 P.2d 585, 588-89. " ... It may be 
stated generally that there is a measure of discretion in a court of equity, both as to the manner 
and the conditions of such a sale, as well as to ordering or refusing a resale. The chancellor will 
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always make such provisions for notice and other conditions as will in his judgment best protect 
the rights of all interested, and make the sale most profitable to all ... " Gibbs v. Claar, 58 Idaho 
510,520,75 P.2d 721,725 (1938) quoting Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason, 145 U.S. 349 (1892).4 
Discretionary decisions are reviewed under and abuse of discretion standard to the 
inquiry is (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether 
the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
At hearing on Chances motion to set aside the Sheriff Sale or to extend the redemption 
period, the District Court correctly perceived the issue before him as one of discretion. The 
District Court stated, 
In many instances, the Court's hands are bound. For example, as it 
relates to imposition of mandatory minimum sentences in unusual 
factual circumstances, I have not - I have no discretion. I cannot 
impose a sentence, other than what is mandated by the legislature, 
regardless of what the equities are. In other cases, there is some 
leeway. (Tr.Vol.I, p.24, In.20 - p.25, In. 1 ) 
The District Court also recognized that its decision would be reviewed on a abuse of 
discretion standard pursuant to the three part test set forth in Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 803 P.2d, 993, 1000 (1991). (R.I72) The District Court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion and acted within the outer bounds of that 
discretion and reached his decision by an exercise of reason. 
4 Notably, in the Gibbs case, the sale price which was not confirmed was 79.5% of the sale price which was 
confirmed. 
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The District Court considered all the equities of this case. The District Court stated, 
If the sale is set aside, Roy Jacobson will no longer receive his 
windfall, but would receive all the money he has paid, plus 
attorney's fees, plus any lost profit he can prove, as well as a 
handsome twelve (12) percent rate of return on these funds, 
pursuant to Idaho Code §28-22-1 04. If, however, the sale is not set 
aside, Mr. Jacobson receives his windfall, and in these harsh 
economic times, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will be able to 
collect from the defendant, Carole Blazier-Henry. If the plaintiffs 
attempt collection, Ms. Carole Blazier Henry may be forced into 
bankruptcy. Similarly, the plaintiffs chances of being made whole 
may then involve litigation. Ms. Blazier-Henry will lose the 
chance to have this judgment satisfied in the near future and the 
blight on her ability to obtain credit will continue. 
The District Court considered the harsh economic times. (R.170-171) "During periods 
of great economic trauma, such as the Great Depression of the 1930's, inadequacy of sales price 
is more likely to move a court to annul a foreclosure sale than during periods of financial 
prosperity." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ahmed L, 1332271,2-4 (NJ.Super.App.Div. 2010) 
(unpublished) citing 79-83 Thirteenth Ave., Ltd. v. DeMarco, 44 N.J.525, 534-35, 210. The 
District Court recognized the hardship that not setting aside the sale would visit on the other 
parties and the District Court provided a remedy to make Jacobson whole. This was an option 
that was available to the District Court and it reached its conclusion to so act through an exercise 
of reason. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling that the consideration paid by 
Jacobson was so inadequate as to shock the conscious of the Court as to justify setting aside the 
Sheriff Sale. The matter was one of discretion and the District Court acted within that discretion. 
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III. Jacobson did not argue that Chance had unclean hands in District Court, and 
cannot do so here, and neither Chance nor Henry are guilty of any inequitable, 
unfair, dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful conduct as to any issue in this case. 
Jacobson argued in District Court that he had clean hands. Jacobson at no point argued 
that Chance had unclean hands. This Court should not consider this issue on appeal. McPheters 
v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003). 
Furthermore, Jacobson argues that Chance has unclean hands because, 1) her counsel 
failed to attend the Sheriff Sale, 2) her counsel failed to involve Jacobson in the process of 
obtaining a stipulation to set aside a Sheriff Sale, 3) Chance failed to file her motion to set aside 
the sale in a timely manner, and 4) Chance failed to exercise the right of redemption in a timely 
manner. None of these are the nefarious conduct to which the unclean hands rule applies and the 
District Court acted within its discretion in not barring Chance's claims based on that doctrine. 
Simply stated the maxim stands for the proposition that "a litigant may be denied relief by a 
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or 
fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 
104 Idaho 137, 145,657 P.2d 1,9 (1983) citing 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 136 (1966) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Chance is not guilty of any of the type of conduct to which that rule applies. Chance's 
counsel mayor may not have made some mistakes, however, in a mortgage foreclosure, " ... 
[e]ven under the lens of the related doctrine-'as between two innocent parties[,] equity will visit 
the loss upon the one by whose act the injury first could have been avoided,' Global Am. Ins. 
Managers v. Perera Co., 137 N.J.Super. 377, 388, 349 A.2d 108 (Ch.Div.1975), affd o.b., 
144 N.J. Super. 24,364 A.2d 546 (App.Div.1976) - in this case, we conclude that a mechanistic 
result is inappropriate. Rather, the multi-faceted balancing of factors that Judge Derman 
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assembled was the proper method for decision-making." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ahmed, A-
4574-08Tl, 2010 WL 1332271 (N.J. Super.App.Div. 2010) (unpublished). 
The District Court considered all the facts of this case, including all the alleged mistakes 
by Chance's counsel, and determined that Jacobson should not receive a windfall at the expense 
of the other parties, even if the mistakes did not constitute "very slight additional circumstances." 
In doing so, the District Court acted well within its discretion and reached its conclusion by an 
act of reason. The District Court's Order setting aside the sheriff sale should be affirmed. 
IV. The District Court correctly determined that Chance likely would have no adequate 
remedy at law to collect the judgment from Henry and the ability to sue Chance's 
counsel for malpractice does not qualify as an "adequate remedy at law" to defeat 
the Court's equitable jurisdiction. 
The District Court expressly found that it was unlikely that Chance could collect the 
judgment form Henry because of these hard economic times and that Henry might be forced into 
bankruptcy. (R.171) That is a finding that Chance likely has no action at law to collect from 
Henry. This is supported in the record as counsel for Chance had to wire money to Henry so 
Henry could drive to town to execute the assignment of her redemption right. (Aug R. 81) 
Jacobson also argues that Chance has an adequate remedy at law because Chance can file suit 
against her prior counsel for the mistake of not bidding in the judgment. The ability to sue a 
different party is not an "adequate remedy at law" for purposes of defeating equitable 
jurisdiction. 
"Where a court of equity has taken jurisdiction it will retain jurisdiction for all purposes, 
decide all issues, award relief which is complete, finally dispose of the litigation and accomplish 
full justice to all litigants and thereby prevent future litigation." Parsons v. Kootenai Rural 
Electrification Ass'n, 71 Idaho 510, 515,234 P.2d 828, 831 (1951). This action was for a 
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judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. (R.12) As such it is an equitable action. Rickel v. Energy 
Sys. Holdings, Ltd., 114 Idaho 585, 587, 759 P.2d 876, 878 (1988). 
If, on the facts stated, the case is of a nature cognizable only in a 
court of equity, the plaintiff will not be shut out of that court on the 
suggestion that on another state of facts he might recover that 
which would be equally satisfactory in another tribunal. 
[ .. ] 
If the right asserted is a subject of original equity jurisdiction, the 
court will entertain it, even though there may be a remedy at law. 
Stewart v. Caldwell, 54 Mo. 536; Pratt v. Clark, 57 Mo. 189; Real 
Estate Sav. Inst. v. Collonious, 63 Mo. 290; Story, Eq. Jur. § 80. 
And the fact that a plaintiff may have a remedy by suit at law 
against a third person, as in this case against the surety on the 
bond, is no ground for refusing relief in equity. Roll v. Smelting 
Co., 52 Mo. App. 60. 
Morris v. Hanssen, 336 Mo. 
169,180,78 S.W.2d 87, 93 
(1934) 
The case here is of a nature only cognizable in a Court of equity. As such, the District 
Court was empowered to use its substantial equitable discretion to fashion a remedy that was fair 
to all parties, which it did. Chance has no adequate remedy at law, but even if she did, the 
District Court would not be divested of its equitable jurisdiction because of this fact. 
V. Jacobson did not object to the admission of Chance's appraisal experts opinion and 
cannot do so for the first time on appeal. 
Jacobson argues that the District Court erred by considering David Noonan's opinion 
because Mr. Noonan did not utilize the correct considerations in determining the fair market 
value of the subject property. This is an objection to the testimony on the grounds of relevance 
and was not raised below and cannot be raised on appeal. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 
397,64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003). 
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Furthermore, Idaho has never adopted the definition of fair market value put forth by 
Jacobson. In this case, such a standard makes no sense because it is highly likely that Chance 
would have ended up with the property if her Judgment would have been bid on and at that point, 
and she would have had the ability to sell the property by way of warranty deed to make herself 
whole. 
VI. The fact that no uniform set of procedures exist between Bonner and Kootenai 
Counties for the placement of credit bids and that this mislead Chance's counsel 
into thinking she did not have to attend the sale is a sufficient slight additional 
factor to justify setting aside the Sheriff Sale. 
The District Court originally ruled that slight additional circumstances were present 
which justified setting aside the Sheriff Sale. After a motion to reconsider, the District Court 
ruled that, " ... there does not appear to be very slight additional circumstances accompanying 
the gross inadequacy of price in this instance" (R. 70), but did not clarify which facts it had 
determined no longer qualified. The District Court did, however, find that Kootenai and Bonner 
Counties utilized different methods in implementing a credit bid at Sheriff Sale. (R.169-170) 
The inconsistencies are a very slight additional factors which when coupled with the gross 
inadequacy of the sales price justify setting aside the Sheriff Sale and it was error for the District 
Court to conclude otherwise. 
A Sheriff Sale may be set aside when the price is so inadequate as to shock the 
conscience of the Court, or grossly inadequate and coupled with a very slight additional 
circumstance. Gibbs v. Claar, 58 Idaho 510, 520, 75 P.2d 721, 725 (1938). Here, the District 
Court found that a variation in procedures existed between Bonner and Kootenai Counties 
regarding the placing of credit bids. It is not disputed that this disparity is what lead Chance's 
counsel to fail to attend the Sheriff Sale. While it mayor may not have been a mistake on 
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Chance's counsel's part, there is no evidence that would have lead Chance's counsel to believe 
that Bonner County would not put in her credit bid. 
The Idaho Code pertaining to levy and sale under execution does not provide for a 
written bid. The Idaho Supreme Court has directed that the Sheriff should accept written bids, 
Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 418, 262 P. 877, 880 (1927), but there is 
no uniformity in what would constitute a written bid and the Idaho Code has adopted no 
procedure for it. Kootenai County provides a form, Bonner County does not. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that the Sheriff would at least bid in the judgment rather than let the 
property be sold for an obviously inadequate price. More so in light of the fact that Sheriff did 
actually reject the $1.00 bid. 
Idaho has no uniform set of procedures for a judgment creditor to put in its judgment at 
Sheriff Sale. This created confusion on the part of Chance's counsel about the necessity of her 
attending the Sheriff Sale. Given the grossly inadequate sales price, this is sufficient additional 
circumstance to justify setting aside the Sheriff Sale and it was in error for the District Court to 
conclude otherwise. 
VII. Jacobson has simply invited this Court to review matters which are committed to 
the sounds discretion of the District Court and should be required to pay Chance's 
attorneys fees and costs on appeal. 
Jacobson failed to appeal the District Court's ruling that Chance is entitled to an 
extension of the redemption period, has challenged a rule of law that is older than the Union on 
grounds that have already been acknowledge and rejected by the United States Supreme Court, 
and has invited this Court to second guess the District Courts exercise of its substantial discretion 
in this matter. Chance is entitled to an award of her attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code §12-121. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 669, 675, 239 P.3d 774,780 (2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court here engaged in a balancing of all the equities and determined that 
Chance was entitled to relief from the Sheriff sale either by way of an extension of the 
redemption period or by setting aside the sheriff sale. The District Court then, after careful 
consideration, fashioned a remedy to do substantial equity for all. The District Court recognized 
the matter as one of discretion and acted within the bounds of that discretion after reasoned 
analysis. This Court should affirm the ruling of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of March, 2012. 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Bistline Law, PLLC 
Attorney for Cross Appellant 
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